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BOOK REVIEW
THE LATEST AND BEST WORD ON LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: A REVIEW ESSAY
OF INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER.

Gary C. Leedes*
I.

Opening Statement

InterpretingLaw and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader I contains several
splendid essays discussing relationships among law, literature, literary
criticism, and hermeneutics. 2 The essays describe methods for "giving
meaning to the black ink on the white page." 3 Editors Sanford Levinson
and Steven Mailloux remind us that hermeneutics is "the theory or art of
explication, of interpretation. Its lineage goes back to ancient attempts
to construct general rules for understanding religious texts such as the
4
Bible."
Legal scholars are concerned with "safe rules" of interpretation,
which distinguish the impartial reader's perspective from "political and
other 'interested' perspectives." 5 The editors, however, ask the following hard questions about the legal method:
Are we really saying anything of substance when we register an expectation that judges "stay within" the constraints provided by the constitutional text? Can one speak meaningfully of a "method" (much less a
"science") of interpretation, or at most, are there only looser "modes"
or "approaches."? Is there only one legitimate mode of interpretation,
such as original intent? If there is more 6than one ....
among them?

principled way of choosing

is there any

These vexing questions and others7 divide the legal community into
competing schools of thought. Similarly, literary experts disagree vehemently with each other about the nature and functions of interpretation.
*

Professor of Law, University of Richmond.
I Sanford Levinson, a Professor of Law, and Steven Mailloux, a Professor of English, are the
Reader's editors and both have contributed essays to the book.
2 Hermeneutics is frequently divided into several fields, e.g., theological, literary, historical, and
legal hermeneutics. The Reader emphasizes legal and literary hermeneutics, which to some extent
overlap with the hermeneutics of history. The roots of the word "hermeneutics" point back to the
mythical messenger-god, Hermes, who was credited by the early Greeks with the discovery of Ianguage and writing.
3 INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEurIC READER - (S. Levinson & S. Mailloux
eds. 1988) [hereinafter READER].
4 Id. at ix-x (citing H. G. GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE 93 (1986)).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 10-11.
7 Among many other perplexing hermeneutic/philosophical questions are the following: What
is denoted and connoted by the words "objective understanding"? What does a successful understanding of a text entail? Does and should our understanding of a text change because of our historical experience? If an author's intention is not a key factor for clarifying obscure meaning, how is a
text to be understood?
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The deconstructionist, Jacques Derrida, for example, does 8not always
agree with the famed hermeneuticist, Hans Georg-Gadamer.
Gadamer describes and explains what happens when we interact
with a text and successfully gather its meaning.9 The social process of
coming to an understanding involves a dialogue among the members of
an interpretive community (readers who share many beliefs).10 Gadamer
takes the position that the concept of objectivity useful in the natural
sciences is not applicable for evaluating the truth of texts."
According to Gadamer, readers approach texts with presuppositions
and prejudices. To some extent, the reading experience confirms or subverts these prejudgments, which have been formed in our culture by its
traditions. Gadamer, however, stresses the need for the reader to approach a text in good faith, rather than to misappropriate its meaning for
partisan purposes.' 2 But he is not always critical of our traditions, which
he believes cannot be completely transcended and placed aside during
the reading experience.
Because Gadamer is not primarily concerned with the reader's
emancipation from often unsuspected ideological delusions, Jurgen
Habermas, of the Frankfurt School, argues that Gadamer's hermeneutics
should be supplemented. 13 One idea behind the Frankfurt School's critical theory movement is that unreflective and uncritical readings perpetuate hidden ideological support for the existing political power
structure.14

Many lawyers can live with Gadamer's description of the reading
process, but they have great difficulty accepting deconstruction, 15 which
the editors describe (followingJacques Derrida) as an "undoing,"1 6 or an
8

A recent debate between Gadamer and Jacques Derrida revealed their inability to communi-

cate well with each other. They were on different wave lengths. See DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCTION:
THE GADAMER-DERRIDA ENCOUNTER (D. Michelfelder & R. Palmer eds. 1989).
9 H. G. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975).
10 G. WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADITION AND REASON 111 (1987).

11 Michael Polanyi stresses how scientific analysis is historically situated and writes that the perceptions and discoveries of scientists are "impelled by the imagination and controlled by plausibility,
which in turn depends upon our general view about the nature of things." M. POLANYI & H. PROSCH,
MEANING 144 (1975). In other words, successful and convincing science depends in part on the rules
of practice and the shifting theoretical attitudes that discipline the scientific community. The paradigms and practices of scientists are not as objective as they once appeared. See generally T. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
12 The deconstructionists' encounters with texts are confrontational, and Derrida regards references to interpretations in good faith as a throwback to outmoded metaphysical concepts of truth.
See Derrida, Three questions to Hans-Georg Gadamer, in DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCTION: THE GADAMERDERRIDA ENCOUNTER, supra note 8, at 53-54.
13 David Hoy's essay in the Reader compares Gadamer's views with his critic, Jurgen Habermas.

Hoy brings the post-structuralist perspectives of deconstruction into clearer view. READER, supra
note 3, at 319-38.
14

See generally R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY (1987); see also J. HABERMAS, A REVIEW

OF GADAMER'S TRUTH AND METHOD IN UNDERSTANDING

AND SOCIAL INQUIRY

(1977).

15 Deconstruction, as the editors point out, is "[o]ne of the most influential approaches to literary analysis." READER, supra note 3, at x. Like'it or not, the editors'judgment on this point is clearly
correct.

16 The usefulness and value of deconstruction is often questioned. See, e.g. J. ELLIS, AGAINST
DECONSTRUCTION (1989). Derrida has explained that "deconstruction used as a French word, means
not 'destroying' but 'undoing,' while analyzing the different layers" of text(s). READER, supra note 3,
at x.
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unraveling of the threads of textual discourse. Deconstruction is, at best,
a fragmented school of thought, and Derrida himself frequently revises
his own explanations, which do not always clarify deconstruction. He is
unapologetic and claims
that language is inadequate for describing his
7
approach to language.'
Deconstruction is more of an interpretive style than a method. It has
relevance to law because deconstructionists closely read texts to spot the
points in which texts conceal their own incoherence and inconsistencies.' 8 Deconstructionists expose gaps and discrepancies between textual meaning and authorial assertions. Derrida claims he is "closer to the
interpretive style of Nietzsche than to the other interpretative tradition
stretching from [Friedrich] Schliermacher to Gadamer."' 19 He experimentally restructures the context of the text in order to raise never-ending questions about our lack of complete understanding. Gadamer
disassociates himself with deconstruction, 20 but he agrees that "interpretation is always on the way," 2 1 because context must be taken into account by interpreters, and the question of the relevant context is often
up for grabs.
Differences of opinion over hermeneutics became politicized and
more widely publicized when conservative officials during the Reagan
presidency ferociously attacked judges who were expanding the zone of
privacy rights. Former Attorney-General Edwin Meese, condemns "an
activist jurisprudence, one which anchors the Constitution only in the
consciences ofjurists ....

22

He urges the Supreme Court to follow the

approach ofJustice Story who once explained that "[t]he first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is to construe them
23
according to the sense of the terms, and the intentions of the parties."
This explanation by Story, according to Meese, captured the spirit of the
Reagan Administration's position. 24 Meese argues that the Framers intended a role for the Court that is more modest than the role embraced
by activist judges like Justice Brennan, for example, who stresses concepts of human dignity. If such concepts are embodied in the Constitution, Meese cannot find them.
Justice Brennan believes that a controlling premise of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments is the intrinsic worth of the human being, and
17

See generally J. DERRIDA, THE EAR OF THE OTHER (1985).

18 READER, supra note 3, at 329-34. See also Spivak, Preface toJ. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY lxxv
(1976). This lucid preface is an extremely helpful introduction to the deconstructive project and
procedure.
19 Derrida, Three Questions to Hans-GeorgGadamer, in DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 8,
at 53.

20

Many post-structuralist critics are occupied, if not preoccupied, with the fragmentation of

understanding, and they are subverting the notion that the black ink on a page has a literal meaning

that constrains an interpreter in a significantly meaningful way. See M. SARUP, AN INTRODUCTORY
GUIDE TO POsT-STRuCTURALISM AND POSTMODERNISM 55-56 (1989).

21

H. G. GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE 105 (1986).

22

READER, supra note 3, at 32.

23 Id. at 28.
24 Id. The Reader also includes excerpts from a fine essay by Charles Fried, a former SolicitorGeneral for the Reagan Administration, who urges us not to diminish our efforts to understand and
interpret the black ink in good faith. Id. at 50-51.
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that capital punishment is "utterly and irreversibly degrading to the very
essence of human dignity."' 2 5 The conception of a human being's intrinsic worth, a vision that permeates the entire Bill of Rights, "will never
cease to evolve." 2 6 The nagging question suggested by Meese's critique
of the interpretive strategy used by Justice Brennan is whether it enables
unelected judges to exploit opportunistically the Constitution's
ambiguity.
Owen Fiss, who often defends Justice Brennan's approach, believes
that "[i]nterpretation, whether it be in the law or literary domains is... a
dynamic interaction between reader and text." 2 7 Fiss believes that most
judges (with exceptions such as Robert H. Bork, against whom he testihave a "special competence"
fied during a senate confirmation hearing)
28
to interact with and interpret texts.
According to Fiss, the competent judge takes an approach to reading
texts that is neither wholly discretionary or wholly mechanical. This middle way "affords a proper recognition of both the subjective and objective dimensions of human experience." 29 Fiss cites the "disciplining
rules" that act as constraints on the judge's discretion. They supply a
"bounded objectivity."' 30 But as Stanley Fish's argumentative essay
and cannot
points out, "rules are [also] texts.., in need of interpretation
31
themselves serve as constraints on interpretation."
Fish reasons that ajudge is "[a]t no time free to go his 'own way,' for
he is always going in a way marked out by the practice or set of practices
of whose defining principles (goals, purposes, interdictions) he is a mov... 32 For example, the judge's interpretation of a text
ing extension.
must be plausible, and what counts as a plausible interpretation depends
on the current beliefs of leading members of the legal community who
generate a consensus of opinion.
An analogy can be drawn to a game played without officials. When
we play a game like "stickball" without an umpire, rules constitute the
game, but, as we play, the concrete application of these rules by the players (who reach a consensus) constantly changes the specific content of
the game and the tactics of the players. In a similar way, the game of
rugby was fashioned. In 1823, one William Webb Ellis picked up the ball
and ran with it during a soccer game-thereafter called rugby football.
Ellis could not have extended the rules, an action which was later authoritatively condoned, "apart from the rules of the game as they then existed." 3 3 Even if we believe that William Webb Ellis exercised brute
force rather than pre-existing authority, the assent of the other players
made the rule change authoritative. Similarly, the legal method allows
25

Id. at 23.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 229.

28 Id. at 241.
29 Id. at 251.
30 Id. at 234.
31 Id. at 252.
32 S. FISH, DOING

WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY
IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989).
33 R. S. PETERS, "AUTHORITY" IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 108 (A. Quinton ed. 1967).
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the rules of law to change after judges exert their will. For the better or
worse, most judges have been conditioned to accept professional norms
that diminish the frequency of rule changes.
It is difficult to describe the processes of interpretation without cryptic references to some of the most confusing and widely debated theoretical concepts in legal and literary hermene utics; namely, "intention,
formalism, and objectivity. ' 3 4 The editors clarify what they mean by
these concepts. They write:
In one of its senses, the termformalism refers to a theory of interpretation that sees the meaning of a text as inherent in the words on the
page, independent of authorial intent, reader response, and historical
context. Intentionalism defines itself against this kind of formalism by
asserting that textual meaning is inseparable from authorial intention,
usually going on to argue that evidence outside the text is crucial to
any correct interpretation of meaning as intention.
Scholarly arguments over intentionalism3 5and formalism "are usually arguments about interpretive objectivity."
Interpretive objectivity, in one of its purest and hypothetical senses,
presupposes that something called meaning exists in a text independently of our reading experience. But contemporary hermeneuticists,
like Gadamer, "overcome the positivistic hubris of assuming we can develop an 'objective' knowledge" of texts, history, and our world.36 Richard Rorty writes: "By now, words like 'scientific' or 'objective' have been
worn down to the point where most people are content to let them mean
'the way we do things around here.' ,,37 If Rorty is right, the phrase "objective interpreter of law" is a tri-oxymoron.
The concepts, intentionalism, formalism, and objectivity, are
presented in separate subsections in the Reader, followed by a section
entitled "Rhetorical Politics." The remaining sections of this review essay are similarly organized.
II.

Intentionalism

Few jurists want to freeze the meaning of the Constitution because
many constitutionalized principles are capable of growth as they are applied to new concrete situations. Therefore, it is dogmatic to insist that
the Framers' original intent must always be followed when judges interpret an ambiguous constitutional provision. Lawyers, who actually believe that the specific intentions of the Framers are ascertainable in any
truthful sense, also probably believe that George Washington chopped
down his father's cherry tree. But there is an important difference between ascribing (or imputing) and actually "finding" the Framers' intent.
Ascribing intent to legislative bodies is part of the art ofjudging. Judge
34
35
36
37

Supra note 3, at 37.
Id. at 41.
G. WARNE, supra note 10, at 1.
Rorty, Deconslruction and Circumvention, II CRITICAL INQUIRY 16 (September 1984).
READER,

380
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Learned Hand wrote, " '[n]obody does this exactly right; great judges do
it better than the rest of us.' "38
Intentionalism, in the parlance of constitutional law, "is... a way of
thinking about constitutional 'meaning' that follows from the basic concepts that legitimate judicial review." '3 9 In many cases, however, the
Court does not know how the Framers would resolve the contemporary
controversy. 40 Nevertheless, if we can ascertain their general concerns,
this will provide us with clues as to the types of practices that the constitutional draftsmen and ratifying conventions wanted to encourage or
prohibit. The Framers' intentions can be plausibly ascribed because, in
some cases, the written evidence of their concerns and objectives are
abundant. 4 1 It is clearly not illegitimate for courts to use historical
42
materials in their research.
The editors, however, refer to influential literary essays entitled
"The Intentional Fallacy" and its companion piece "The Affective Fallacy." 4 3 These essays are significant because their authors, William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, were among the first literary critics who
effectively argued against reliance upon authorial intent. Wimsatt and
Beardsley, however, were convinced
that "literary and legal interpreta'4 4
tion have little in common."
Wimsatt and Beardsley were wary of reliance upon authorial intentions because they believed that extra-textual information about a
poem's creation does not help interpreters understand the poem's aesthetic contribution. But lawyers and judges, in practice, are not usually
evaluating the aesthetic contributions of a last will and testament or the
fourteenth amendment. Therefore, to some extent, Wimsatt's and
Beardsley's views are not directly relevant to legal hermeneutics.
Concerning authorial intentions, neither the editors nor Wimsatt
and Beardsley carefully distinguish the "unknowability problem" from
4 5 It
the "undesirability problem," but this distinction is often useful.
may be undesirable to follow the author's intent even when we know it;
in other cases, we wish we could discern an author's intent, but we are
unable to do so with confidence because we are too worried about the
danger of error. The danger of distortion lies in the ambiguity of the
38 Proceedings of a Special Session of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
to commemorate Fifty Years of Federal Judicial Service by the Honorable Learned Hand 37 (Apr.
10, 1959).
39 Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 375 (1981).
40 D. DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 161 (1987).

41 In Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), ChiefJustice Marshall
explained that the underlying reason of a constitutional provision governs situations unanticipated
when the text was framed. Id. at 644.
42 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). If historical guideposts are abandoned or
ignored, the temptation is great forjudges to "[roam] at large in the constitutional field." Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). The law's appearance of continuity is one of its important characteristics, which is not to say that its discontinuities lack hermeneutic relevance.
43 READER, supra note 3, at 37-42.
44 Id. at 41. Today, many literary theorists have narrowed, if not closed, the gap between literary and legal interpretation.
45 C. GRAFF, PROFESSING LITERATURE 202-03 (1987).
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documents from which we need to gather the author's intentions. In
some cases, the ambiguity of the documents relevant to the Framers' intent exceeds the ambiguity of the Constitution. Needless to say, the project of generalizing what was intended by the people who participated,
two hundred years ago, in all the ratifying state conventions is mind boggling. However, even when we cannot know exactly what the Framers
intended, we can sometimes fairly state, with reasonable hermeneutic
certainty, what they did not intend to accomplish.
A long view of history often helps reconcile a conflict between the
Framers' specific intentions and a particular case holding. 46 For example, E.D. Hirsch, Jr., an intentionalist, writes-convincingly in my viewthat the dominant intention of the equal protection clause was captured
by Brown v. Board of Education4 7 not Plessy v. Ferguzson.4 8 In legal hermeneutics, "[t]he judge who adapts the transmitted law to the needs of the
present is undoubtedly seeking to perform a practical task, but his interpretation of the law is by no means on that account an arbitrary re49
interpretation."

Dean Paul Brest writes that "one can better protect fundamental values and the integrity of the democratic processes by protecting them
than by guessing how other people meant to govern a different society a
hundred or more years ago." 50 But the question admittedly unanswered
by Brest, and not answered effectively by any other scholar, is how we
can legitimately derive fundamental values from a text that does not list
or rank them. This question, in part, relates to political theory. Legal
hermeneutics, however, may help us think more clearly about political
theory.
The meaning of a constitutional provision becomes more complete
"by seeing the past in its continuity with the present." 51 Recall that, according to Gadamer, hermeneutic understanding is the generation of a
shared meaning, and this "sharing involves more than either a knowledge of what an author's intentions were or a capacity to reconstruct
them." 5 2 Gadamer's notion of shared meaning refers to communis sensus
(a common sense view) that emerges in the community as people engage
in dialogues about their understanding of textual content. The implications for political theory lie in the notion of a emergent shared meaning
that is dynamic. This communal notion is in tension, if not opposition,
with the view that the Framers or an elite group of judges should have
the final word on textual meaning.
46 In the 18th century, "[n]orms generally seemed to those times and their representative thinkers to be the more important and valuable, the more general they were." C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 1963). This is a comforting thought to those of us
who connect case rulings to enduring general norms.
47 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
49 H. G. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 292 (1975).
50 READER, supra note 3, at 96.
51 H.G. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 292..
52 G. WARNKE, supra note 10, at 47.
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Formalism

In his essay on constitutional language, Frederick Schauer warns us
"to look at the words of the Constitution as language, and... to examine
closely some of our rarely questioned presuppositions about constitutional language." 53 We are told that "constitutional language acts as a
significant constraint on constitutional decision." 5 4 If constitutional language performs its delimiting functions, there will be more easy cases
and fewer abuses of power by officials. 55
Schauer directs our attention to the question of how meaning is produced by language. He points out that jurists who focus on language
tend to avoid the lures of "free-wheeling theories." 56 He clings to the
idea that the inclusions and exclusions of the Constitution's text rule out
pursuing whatever appears to be "the Good."' 57 Schauer even rejects the
guidance of original intent because, in his view, the text, not the Framers,
is the primary object of reference for interpreters seeking the Constitu58
tion's contemporary meaning.
Schauer reasons that we need a theory of constitutional language in
order to understand why some clauses of the Constitution are clear and
others are vague.5 9 This is the typical approach of the linguist.60 Lin61
guists want "to shed light upon the functioning of language as such."
Unlike the hermeneutical approach, where context-situated comprehension is the primary concern, the linguist "instead asks how it is possible
to communicate anything at all." 62 Schauer's hope is that a pre-theoretical focus on the nature of language will rein in theories that presuppose
"a carte blanche for moral philosophizing." 6 3
If the wording of the text presents interpretive problems, formal semantic analysis 6 4does not settle disputes over the theory of meaning that
53 READER, supra note 3, at 133.
54 Id. at 134. In some of his other work, Schauer focuses on several of the philosophical underpinnings of the political principles referred to by the Constitution. See, e.g., F. SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
55 Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 50 (1987).
56 READER, supra note 3, at 152.
57 Schauer, supra note 55, at 50.
58 Id. at 44. Schauer writes that "our touchstone must be the rules of language rather than the
largely futile explorations into the mind of the communicator." READER, supra note 3, at 140. We
are reminded that justifiable interpretations "derive originally from some particular portion of the
text [under examination]." Id. at 152.
59 READER, supra note 3, at 133.
60 Stanley Fish explains that "[mleaning is always a function of the interpretive conditions of
production and reception and never a function of formal linguistic structures." Fish, Dennis AIartinez
and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1774 n.2 (1987).
61 Gadamer, Text and Interpretation, in DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCrION, supra note 8.
62 Id.
63 READER, supra note 3, at 141. Schauer realizes that communication is ajoint venture, and that
therefore the meaning of a law is not merely a function of its constituent sentences, words, and
syllables. See also S. FISH, supra note 32.
64 Semantics is, inter alia, the study of words and sentences. Different semantic theories explain
what meaning is and what is a meaningful expression. Gerald Graff, a literary theorist, writes critically about what is often called the fallacy of semantic immanence, and states "much thinking about
meaning and interpretation among legal professionals is badly outmoded, and ... it remains intact
only for fear of the Pandora's box that would be opened if more up-to-date theories were admitted
into court." READER, supra note 3, at 176. In his essay, Schauer follows a pragmatic, ordinary language approach and he regards law as a "use of natural language for a particular purpose, in accord-
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an interpreter should adopt. To further complicate matters, in constitutional cases, judges customarily consider not only specific textual provisions, but the Constitution as a whole, its structure, precedent, the
Framers' intent, notions of formal justice, federalism, the separation of
powers, rules ofjusticiability, the presuppositions of democracy and basic societal values. Therefore, the hermeneutic problem is how the context-situated judge can "do justice to the multivocity of language while
striving at the same time to overcome the trivial fixation of words and
meanings." '6 5 Schauer attempts to overcome formalism and conceptualism by widening his focus to include the distinctive, if not unique,
presuppositions of specialized language which set the Constitution apart
from the social rules governing "ordinary language."' 66 Schauer, nevertheless, posits a "meaning" of the Constitution that exists apart from
moral philosophy, theory, an author's intent, or a reader's state of
mind. 67 Whence does this meaning derive?
According to Schauer, constitutional language can "set the boundaries of theory-construction without otherwise directing its development." 68 Although many areas of uncertainty are eliminated by
Schiuer's boundary-setting principles, other uncertainties enter the picture since boundary-setting devices also require interpretation. Nevertheless, Schauer argues that the constitutional text and its boundarysetting constraints provide "the contours of permissible moral
69
arguments."
Schauer admits that various provisions of the Constitution "send us
outside of the legal domain and into the moral and political." 7 0 In order
to preventjudges from endorsing a particular moral premise to serve as a
foundation for an all-encompassing moral theory, Schauer argues that
several open-textured provisions in the Constitution are based on a plurality of several different independent principles. 71 This concession,
however, opens up many additional areas of interpretive uncertainty
when there is a dispute about a text's meaning.
Although there is not a complete fusion of constitutional law and
moral philosophy, many judges (for example, Justice Brennan) bring into
play their concerns about society's morality when making a decision. Indeed, for Edwin Meese, the example of Justice Brennan's fusion of his
ideological viewpoints (about capital punishment, abortion, and obscenance ... with certain social (rather than semiotic) conventions." B. JACKSON, SEMIOTrCS AND LEGAL
THEORY 13 (1985).
65 Gadamer, Hermeneutics and Logocentrism, in DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCrION, supra note 61, at
124. "It is the meaning of a communication in words that engages our attention and interest, not the
words as such." H. PROSCH & M. POLANYI, MEANINGS 71 (1975).
66 READER, supra note 3, at 134.
67 I hasten to add that Schauer gladly concedes that "an interpretation cannot be uniquely derived from the text ... alone." Id. at 152. Schauer also notes that constitutional language is not
given its due by interpretations that are too literal. Id. at 135. He also emphasizes how conventions
change the meaning of language over time, but even here he seems relieved that these changes take
place in small incremental steps. Id. at 151.
68 Id. at 150.
69 Id. at 141.
70 Id. at 150.
71 See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHIC ENQUIRY (1982).
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ity) with the Constitution demonstrates the wisdom of Schauer's less
freewheeling constitutionalism. 72 Schauer's choice of metaphors often
disguises how he artfully transplants his prudential concerns into the
text. In short, Schauer fears the opening of Pandora's box. His riskaverse strategy is intentionally devised to reduce the perils created by
[missing something]
Schauer's essay includes the metaphor that constitutional language
is a frame. 73 The metaphor of the frame creates the illusion of closure
around a comprehensive unity. But the reader should be aware that such
illusions often distort reality. As Schauer admits elsewhere, 74 words do
not frame themselves. Words "inside a text" 75 remain completely inoperative until readers, like Justice Brennan, bring to bear their own frames
of reference. A reader's mind determines what counts as text, frame, and
context. One might prefer to say that words are tools rather than frames.
As tools, the words are used in accordance with the reader's purposes.
For example, you, not the hammer, decide whether it is used as a paperweight or as a nail driver. The functional test is whether a tool works to
76
suit the user's purposes.
Schauer also uses the trope that the text is like a blank canvas that
reminds us when we go well over the edge; but interpretation determines
the size of the canvas, how far it can be stretched, and whether it is part
of a triptych or a mosaic. Schauer's trope brings to mind the idea that
''77
language is an "abstract system that is prior to any occasion of use,
and that this system formally constrains the abuse of words by willful
interpreters. 78 But Schauer's edged canvas is not as blank as he pictures
it to be. As he himself admits, the canvas upon which constitutional lawyers draw contains numerous social rules, presuppositions of law, and
constitutionalized canons of interpretation. These unwritten rules can
be used to extend the previously accepted boundaries of textual
understanding.
Another metaphor of Schauer's suggests that several discrete clauses
in the Constitution "are like a series of funnels, separate from each other,
but open to receive anything of the right size that may be poured into
72 Constitutionalism for Justice Brennan entails respect for human worth and dignity. This ingredient is in tension with Schauer's boundary-setting notion, which restricts the discretion of activist jurists who build moral theories upon the premise of irrepressible human dignity.
73 READER, supra note 3, at 151.
74 Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 430-31 (1985).
75 Schauer argues that "before we can argue intelligently about whether to go outside of the
text, we ought to explore the meaning of the words inside the text" in order to know what counts as
going outside. READER, supra note 3, at 133.
76 If the reader's purpose is to ascertain if the evolving standards of human dignity disclose
whether capital punishment is unconstitutional, the reader's frame of reference already lies beyond
the words in the eighth amendment. Ifjudges get away with substituting words like human dignity for
cruel and unusualpunishment, they escape from the prison-house conception of the Constitution's lan-

guage. Schauer seeks to prevent this escape by rejecting metaphors picturing "a Constitution sufficiently plastic and porous that a wide range of different meanings can be attached to the text."
Schauer, supra note 55, at 41.
77 S. FIsH, supra note 32, at 6.
78 Schauer observes in passing that the examination of the Constitution's language "logically is
prior to any broader interpretation of the Constitution." READER, supra note 3, at 133.
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them." 79 But judges regularly expand and contract meaning as they periodically combine and rearrange these "funnels" into new constellations
and sizes. Certainly we have to keep the words of the Constitution in
mind or they become superfluous. Schauer not only keeps the words in
mind, but is also able to isolate words inside a text that supposedly has
"independent interpretive force."' 0 The language of the text is, for
Schauer, an interpreter's starting point and a constant check point.,' But
from a less formal, hermeneutic standpoint, a text is not merely "a given
82
object but a phase in the execution of a communicative event."
The words inside the Constitution may in a particular case be the
interpreter's most useful starting point. This eventuality depends upon
the method of interpretation that is being employed by the purposeful
reader. As Walter Benn Michaels writes: "To read is always already to
have invoked the category of the extrinsic, an invocation that is denied
. .not only by avowedly formalist critics but by all those who think of
textual meaning as in any sense intrinsic. '"88 In other words, "there is no
text independent of some interpretation, and
what counts as relevant in
'8 4
the text is dependent on the interpretation.
Schauer's pre-theoretical focus on language informs us that legal
texts are "real" and tell their "own story."'8 5 Michaels objects to this
vestige of text fetishism pointing out that the notion of a "text by itself"
is oxymoronic because a text in isolation is actually8 no
text at all without
6
people who agree about its meaning and function.
We can sum up our analysis of Schauer's semi-formalism by recalling
his interpretive strategy. He wants to exclude wrong answers to easy
cases. He also wants to manage our uncertainty more effectively.8 7 Finally, he wants to prevent abuses of judicial power. Schauer concedes
that his emphasis on text is merely a means to further inculcate his interpretive strategy.88 This weakens his argument that the text has real
*

79
80

Id. at 152.
Schauer writes,
[I]f we take texts as having independent interpretive force, we will at least stay with them
longer before searching for something else. We will be inclined to wrestle with the text
rather than abandon it. Our inclinations will tend more towards mining everything there is
to be mined from the text before moving on.
Schauer, supra note 55, at 46.
81 In the hermeneutic circle, to which Gadamer refers (which has no specified pre-theoretical
starting or ending points), one circularity moves between the reader and what is read, and another
circularity moves back and forth between parts of the Constitution to the whole corpus of constitutional law. But see Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 430-31 (1985).
82 Gadamer, Text and Interpretation, in DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCrIoN, supra note 61, at 35.
83 READER, supra note 3, at 223.
84 Id. at 320.
85 Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 44 (1987).
86 READER, supra note 3, at 223.
87 Id at 153.
88 Schauer concedes that "the appeal of a constitution of frustration and impediment ... involves the incukation of the [admittedly arguable] view that what seems right or good . . . to the
decisionmaker might nevertheless be ruled out by the words of a text or a rule." Id at 50 (emphasis
added). Schauer's statement, which opposes the right and good with the words of the text, partially
undermines itself, since the greater the constraint of the Constitution on the elected officials, the
greater the power of the federal judiciary. Although we can agree that Schauer's semi-formal view of
the Constitution makes eminently good sense for commentators for whom "abuse of power" is the
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properties that are the interpreter's "ultimate object of reference." 8 9 Indeed, it is not the text itself but Schauer's methods of reading that integrate the conventional norms of the legal profession with the text and
thereby imbue it with special legal significance and meaning. Schauer's
essay, if its repressed meaning is brought out into the open, rather than
disguised in semi-formal garb, lends credence to the idea that "there are
no longer any constraints on interpretation that are not themselves
interpretive.' 9 0
IV.

Objectivity

There is no consensus among lawyers concerning the definitions of
subjectivity 9 ' and objectivity. 9 2 "The staunchest positivist must admit
some degree of subjectivity in interpretation just as the most committed
[realistic] subjectivist must acknowledge the existence of something in
the object outside the interpreter's mind." 93 Many of "[o]ur ideas as to
what constitutes an objective judgment
or rational decision are them'94
selves ideas of a particular tradition.
Jurists who insist on a scientific concept of objectivity are unrealistically demanding. Scientific methods for achieving textual understanding
do not exist. Indeed, what counts as objective knowledge, even within
the natural sciences, depends on practices and narratives intertwined
with historically determined norms and conventions.
Gadamer contends that it is virtually impossible to rid our understanding of the attitudes and beliefs that traditionally arise out of our
own situation in time (history) and space (place in the world). 95 These
pre-judgments are often called prejudices, but who is authorized to say
when the beliefs that we take for granted are not trustworthy convictions? We might answer that the community decides, but a community
consensus, concerning acceptable interpretations, is always in the process of formation or disintegration. Under this view, however, we can
never know what a text absolutely means because of the changing community consensus.
Editor Sanford Levinson refers to the Constitution as "a linguistic
system, what some among us might call a discourse." 9 6 He argues that it
is "naive" to believe that the document called the Constitution is a "gen"paramount evil," id., it is hard to believe that this is because of properties or essences in the
languge of the fourteenth amendment.
89
90

91

Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 44 (1987).
S. FISH, supra note 32, at 9.
Subjectivity obviously is a complex concept. See generally J. FISHKIN, BEYOND SUBJECTIVE MO-

(1984). Like objectivity, it can mean many things.
92 The claim that the law is objective refers inter alia to transcendent natural law, to the use of
impartial procedures, or to some impersonal procedure as determined by mathematics or the natural
sciences. Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 369 (1986).
93 Note, Dworkin and Subjectivity in Legal Interpretation, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1517, 1540 (1988).
94 G. WARNKE, supra note 10, at 80 (paralleling Gadamer's views).
RALITY

95

H.G. GADAMER, supra note 9, at 239.

96

Levinson, Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion: Or, Would You Sign the Constitution?, 29 Wm. &

MARY L. REV. 113, 142 (1987).
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uine source of guidance" to its interpreters. 97 Levinson does not believe
that "all constitutional approaches are equal," but he "remain[s] troubled as to how one could ever genuinely establish the superiority of any
given constitutional theory." '98 Levinson is frustrated because interpretive truth is or seems to be so elusive.
Levinson writes that "[i]f one takes seriously the views articulated by
Nietzsche... one must give up the search for principles and methods of
constitutional interpretation." 99 Richard Weisberg claims that the following statement by Levinson distorts Nietzsche's position:1 0 0 "For a
Nietzschean reader of constitutions, there is no point in searching for a
code that will produce 'truthful' or 'correct' interpretations; instead, the
interpreter, . . . 'simply beats the text into a shape which will serve his
own purpose." 10 ' Weisberg10 2 argues forcefully that Nietzsche did not
want to become a master over text; he really desired "to comprehend
what an author says."' 0 3 According to Weisberg, relying in part on Hendrik Birus, "Nietzsche's hermeneutics is text-oriented and sharply critical
of what today would be called 'reader-response' reactions to written
words."' 0 4 Clearly Weisberg's statements about Nietzsche's mode of
reading seem to contradict Levinson's statement (which actually included
a quotation from Richard Rorty)10 5 that readers may beat texts into
shapes that suit their purposes.
97 READER, supra note 3, at 159. Levinson's sense of "hopelessness" stems from the inability of
jurists, including himself, to resolve the dialectical tension in the Constitution, which is a text that
"offers no guidance as to the dilemma generated by ... the multiplicity (and contradictions) of
constitutional values." Id at 459 n.110.
98 Id. at 457 n.62. Levinson admits that he has no answer at all to anyone who happens to
disagree with his methods for interpreting a constitution, and "there is no way to resolve the dispute
when interpreters of constitutions disagree." Id. at 161.
99 Id. at 162.
100 It has been claimed that Nietzsche was a nihilist who viewed life as meaningless, and subscribed to no values whatsoever. See A. DANTO, NIETZSCHE AS PHILOSOPHER (1965). But see Schact,
Nietzsche and Nihilism, in NIETZSCHE: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS (R. Solomon ed. 1973).

Nietzsche, like Levinson, continually questions the premises that are often irrationally taken for
granted by the herd, but in Nietzsche's writing, unlike Levinson's "there is a sustained celebration of
creativity."

M. SARUP, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO POST-STRUCTURALISM AND POSTMODERNISM 96

(1989).
READER, supra note 3, at 182-83.
102 According to Richard Weisberg, "to confuse for a general relativism what were in fact [Nietzsche's] contemporary dissatisfactions would be a grave error." Id. at 185. Nietzsche, according to
Weisberg, did not depict textuality "as one more endlessly interpretable, metaphorically fluid notion." Id. at 181.
103 Id at 185.
104 Id at 181.
105 In his article, Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism, 64 MONIST 155 (1981),
Rorty's glib reference to readers who beat texts into shape makes more sense if we assume that he
was not referring to the opportunistic manipulator of words, but to the "strong textualist," a reader
who "prides himself ... on getting more [useful knowledge] out of the text than its author or its
intended audience could possibly have found there." Id. at 167. Rorty explains that the strong
textualist is not a passive receptacle into which information is poured by texts; like the psychoanalyst, the strong textualist wants to discover repressed meanings of texts, for her own therapeutic and
pedagogical purposes. See id. at 166. It does not appear that either Levinson or Weisberg understood Rorty's reference exactly this way.

101
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Against Levinson, Weisberg cites Nietzsche's "vitalistic notion 0of6
justice" which should be administered impersonally once it is codified.1
But how can the administrator/interpreter be constrained if a codified
text of justice is as ambiguous as the American Constitution? The administrator will be stymied, as Levinson is, if the text codifying vitalistic
notions of justice offers inadequate guidance.
Weisberg correctly indicates that, for Gadamer and Nietzsche, the
07
reader's primary task is comprehending the subject matter of the text. 1
But what do we mean when we say such things? Gadamer claims that a
reader's response to a text "is marked by an ontologically unclarified dependence on the semantic starting point." 10 8 For Gadamer, "[t]he task
of interpretation always poses itself when the meaning content of the
printed word is disputable, and it [becomes] a matter of attaining the
correct understanding of what is being announced."1 0 9 At this point, if
not before, the reader places the text's subject matter within a certain
context and tradition.110
There is, however, no algorithm that resolves differences of opinion
among readers. Readers themselves must resolve their differences." 1 '
But a problem arises when conversing readers who differ with each other
cannot find a common language to express themselves. Levinson writes
that "there is no reason to believe that the community of persons interested in constitutional interpretation will coalesce around one or another
[particular formula (or conceptual framework) for interpreting the Constitution]." 12 This "Tower of Babel" type of difficulty presents a challenge and an opportunity for judges who assertively assume creative
leadership roles.
Levinson suggests that Chief Justice John Marshall, "the great Nietzschean 1 3 judge of our tradition," ' 1 4 "bent the Constitution" to conform to his political vision. 1 15 Levinson's comparison of Marshall and
Nietzsche is provocative. However, Marshall's majestic opinions rarely
demystified the law-unlike Nietzsche, who often appears to be a demystifying interpreter clearing away illusions embedded in words. 116 The
106 Nietzsche's conception of a vitalistic notion ofjustice suggests to us that reason and impulse
are joined together in a genealogy (power/discourse formation). It seems unlikely that language is
adequate to convey, in any exact way, the parameters of such a vitalistic notion.
107 Gadamer also agrees with Nietzsche and Weisberg that there are different kinds of texts that
elicit and direct different kinds of reader responses. We do not read humorous texts, ideologically
slanted propaganda, constitutions, and poems in the same way. Gadamer, Text and Interpretation, in
DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCTION (1989), supra note 8, at 37-39.

108 Gadamer, Hermeneutics and Logocentricism, in DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCTION (1989), supra note
61, at 125.
109 Id. at 35.
110 G. WARNKE, supra note 10, at 77.
111 See [Gadamers] Letter to Dallmayr, in DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 8, at 95.
112 READER, supra note 3, at 163.
113 Levinson uses the adjective Nietzschean loosely to signify that " 'interpretation' inevitably
implies a struggle for mastery in the formation of political consciousness." Id. at 162.
114
115

Id. at 165.
Id. Levinson worries about creative and charismatic "judges who break the bonds of confin-

ing legal conventions." Id. at 165.
116

A. MEGILL, PROPHETS OF EXTREMITY 85 (1985).
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Marshall Court assumed a god-like role,' 17 and the artificial reasoning of
the law was sanctified. But Marshall's explications of the Constitution
squarely present the question that Nietzsche left open: namely, whether
[Einlegen] of meaning and not a discovery
"interpretation is an insertion
11 8
[Finden] of meaning."
Nietzsche's attitude about truth-whether it is found, discovered, or
created-is ambiguous.1 19 Nietzsche stated "that every view is only one
among many possible interpretations," 12 0 and he undermined the epistemology of his day by writing in the Gay Science: "We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for 'truth.' "121 These statements-admittedly
snippets that caricature his world view-tend to support Levinson's statement that "[i]t was Nietzsche, after all who emphasized the reduction of
'truth' to the views of one's perspective."' 1 22 Perhaps it would be more
accurate to say that Nietzsche's writings teach us to consider many perspectives, in order to avoid imprisoning our minds in any one framework
of thought.
Because of telling specimens of writing too numerous to cite, 123 Levinson uses the word "Nietzschean" as a symbol for the realization that we
have no grounds for knowing whether we are deceived by appearances,
and that the different ways of seeing and knowing need not ever yield a
single unified picture or interpretation. Gadamer also writes, "from
Nietzsche, we learned to doubt the grounding of truth in the self-certainty of self-consciousness."' 12 4 We also learn from Weisberg to be
more careful about our citations of Nietzsche, whose texts are often plundered to support so-called "Nietzschean" views that he opposed. 12 5
Gadamer and Derrida agree that a text's meaning depends in part on
the reader's response, but they disagree over the meaning and significance of Nietzsche's writings. 126 To some extent, postmodernists, like
Derrida, abuse Nietzsche's notion of a text when they "see it as one more
endlessly interpretable, metaphorically fluid notion."' 12 7 Derrida finds in
Nietzsche's works 128 "the systematic mistrust of metaphysics as a whole
...

the concept of the philosopher-artist... the suspicion of the values of

truth ('well applied convention'), of meaning.., and the liberation of the
signifier from its dependence . . . [on the metaphysical] concept of
117 Marshall, the federalist, is more apollonian than dionysian; his opinions stress restraint, harmony, and measurable law.
118 Gadamer, Text and Interpretation, in DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 8, at 30.
119
120

A. NEHAMAS, NIETZSCHE, LIFE AS LrrERATURE 173-74 (1985).
Id. at 1.

121

Id. at 45.

122
123

READER, supra note 3, at 168.
See the collection of excerpts in DECONSTRUCTION IN CONTExT: LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY

191-219 (M. Taylor ed. 1986).
124
125

Gadamer, Text and Interpretation, in DIALOGUE & DECONs-rRUCrION, supra note 8, at 29.
Gadamer believes that Nietzsche is interpreted in fundamentally different ways and that "this

cuts the ground out from all efforts at a unitary understanding of Nietzsche." [Gadamer's]Letter to
Dailmayr, in DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 8, at 93.
126 See generally DIALOGUE & DECONSTRUCrION, supra note 8.

127

Den-ida, much to Weisberg's chagrin, claims Nietzsche as a precursor. Spivak, Translator's

Preface, inJ. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY xxi (1976).

128
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truth."' 12 9 Perhaps Derrida reads too much into Nietzsche, but there is
something about Nietzsche's writing that reminds us that there is "no
every case which of our interpretaneutral standard which determines in
130
tions is right and which is wrong."'
Some liberal scholars still cling to the model of neutral principles,
Owen Fiss, among others. In response to Levinson's essay, Fiss argues
that a text communicates signs to objective interpreters who are seekers
of true meaning. Fiss is unwilling to equate the rule of law with raw insti13 1
tutional power. He maintains that law is more than "masked power."'
Levinson's analysis of the hermeneutic problem according to Fiss,
"calls into question the very point of constitutional adjudication . . .
threatens our social existence . . .and demeans our lives."'

32

Fiss be-

lieves that Levinson embraces a nihilistic conception of hermeneutics
which drains the Constitution of meaning.13 3 For Fiss, certain "disciplining rules" transform the "interpretive process from a subjective to an
objective one. Presumably, these disciplinary rules "furnish the stan13 4
dards by which the correctness of the interpretation can be judged."'
Another constraint is the "idea of an interpretive community which recognizes these rules as authoritative."' 3 5 Thus, even "for Fiss objectivity
13 6
in legal interpretation is always relative to the legal community."'
Although Levinson's hand-wringing over the divided legal community's "fractured and fragmented discourse"' 3 7 has caused an uproar, his
discomfort should be distinguished from nihilism' 3 8-a term not ordinarily used with precision and clarity. Professor Levinson obviously
"take[s] the constitutional firmament seriously,"' 1 9 has a world view,
subscribes to values, and does not refer with despair to the triviality of
human existence. Nonetheless, it is fashionable to call ambivalent scholars "nihilists" when they "argue that law is neither rational nor objective
of rationality of the episteby holding up the impossibly high standards
140
mological tradition of philosophy."'
129

Id. (Material within single quotes is Spivak's quotation of Nietzsche's statement.).

130
131

A. NEHAMAS, supra note 119, at 3.
READER, supra note 3, at 230.

132 Id. at 248-49.
133 But Fish writes, "the Constitution cannot be drained of meaning, because . . .meaning is
always being conferred on it by the very political and institutional forces Fiss sees as threats." Id. at
267.
134

READER, supra note 3, at 233.

135 Id. To Fiss's criticism, Levinson has responded. He writes: "The united interpretive community that is necessary to Fiss's own argument simply does not exist." Id. at 172. All that does exist,
right now, is "the fractured and fragmented discouise available to us." Id. at 173.
136 Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 332, 351 (1986).
137

READER, supra note 3, at 173.

138 Many academic scholars use the word nihilism more loosely than I do. For me, the telltale
symptom of widespread nihilism is a totally alienated people who lack public spirit, who are selfcentered, and believe in nothing. These people become vulnerable because the vacuum in their lives
can be filled by the emotional rantings of a fanatic leader, a totalitarian, who has contempt for enduring Western values and humanitarian and humane ideals.
139

READER, supra note 3, at 173.

140 Stick, supra note 136, at 342. "Levinson is ... sensitive to the difficulties of nihilism as an
epistemological position.., and bases much of his own disagreement with liberal legal theorists on
more sound political ...

arguments ....

Id. at 346 n.46.
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In sum, despite the inability of legal theory to justify the liberal state,
on grounds that are not excessively abstract and meaningless, the legal
system remains viable. 14 1 American constitutional law is still considered
legitimate and authoritative partly because opinion leaders in the legal
profession have mastered the art and technology of political persuasion.
V.

Rhetorical Politics

Editors Levinson and Mailloux conclude the Reader with several essays that refer to the power of practical reasoning and the technology of
political persuasion. The editors ask whether a study of the "rhetorical
14 2
underpinnings of all interpretive arguments" yields useful insights.
The insights that are useful to the student of rhetorical politics pertain to
the qualities of interpretations that are well-reasoned, interesting, motivating, otherwise desirable, and somehow ultimately convincing. A hermeneutic emphasis on rhetorical politics is virtually an admission that the
43 for trustworthy interpretations of the
search for a fail-safe foundation
44
Constitution is futile.1
W.V. Quine writes (with deadpan humor?) that rhetoric "is the rallying point for advertisers, trial lawyers, politicians, and debating
teams." 1 45 Plato illustrated how rhetoric dupes ignorant audiences into
believing that they are knowledgeable.14 6 Aristotle also condemned
rhetoric, but only that kind that" 'made the worse argument appear better.' "147 Aristotle also emphasized how rhetoric can be used beneficially
to help people understand the view that most nearly accords with the
facts.

14 8

But what are we to think of the contemporary neo-Marxist literary
critic who uses rhetoric to "appropriate from [words] whatever may be
valuable for socialism?" 1 49 Does our view depend on our commitment to
socialism? What are we to think of the argument that the fourth amendment requires warrants for aerial surveillance, notwithstanding the ordinary usage of the word "search"? Does our legal solution to the abortion
141 On the whole, the Court's decisions are regularly obeyed voluntarily, and its role as a
respected umpire is settled for the near future. Moreover, its potential arbitrariness is limited by its
placement in an interpretative tradition that eventually reins in most Justices. Furthermore, since
the Court insists that it gladly accepts the normative authority of the Constitution, which it interprets
as the supreme law of the land, we advocates have the opportunity to convince five justices that any
previous decision, that we want reversed, is not authoritative.
142 READER, supra note 3, at xiii.
143 Foundationalism refers to thought that is based on a firm ground or metaphysical grfindnorm,
which renders an objective aura to our judgments. To achieve objectivity, the thinker attempts to
"stand apart from political, partisan, and 'subjective' concerns." S. FISH, supra note 32, at 343.
144 Many of the authors of the essays in the section entitled "Rhetorical Politics" have abandoned
foundationalism and scientific hermeneutics, and they deny the possibility of a transcendental, politically neutral standpoint for understanding texts. None of the essayists, however, assert that all truth
claims are equally worthy of belief.
145 W. V. QUINE, QUIDDITIES: AN INTERMITrENTLY PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY 183 (1987).
146 In Plato's Dialogues, rhetoricians are made to appear as "relativistic foils for the idealistic Socrates." S. FISH, supra note 32, at 472.
147 Id. at 472.
148 Id. at 476-79.
149 S.FISH, supra note 32, at 495 (citing T. EAGLETON, WALTER BENJAMIN OR TOWARDS A REVOLUTIONARY CRITICISM 113 (1981)).
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controversy depend on whether we want the Constitution to protect a
larger zone of privacy? What are the limits within which an intellectually
honest advocate works?
When we go public with our judgments, we are usually constrained
by folkways, practices, and conventions. Although ourjudgments are not
necessarily verifiable scientifically, we nevertheless resolutely defend
them. Justice Holmes, an ethical relativist, was ready to die (and kill) for
some of his political beliefs, even as he warned us that " 'certitude is not
the test of certainty.' "150 But what makes any of our beliefs and judgments worthy of acceptance by others?
The editors refer at length to Chaim Perelman's study of practical
reasoning, which analyzes argumentation worthy of belief.15 1 Perelman
explains why convincing interpretations are not dependent on definitive,
unquestionable, universal truths, 15 2 formal logic, mathematics, or the
natural sciences. To the extent that arguments about interpretation involve assertions that are not demonstrably true, "[t]he domain of argu153
mentation is that of the credible, the plausible, and the probable."'
Argumentation is more or less convincing (stronger or weaker) to the
extent that it gains the approval of the relevant competent audience. In
short, one pragmatic test to distinguish between the exercise of sheer
power and the exercise of authority lies in the capacity of the assertion to
induce assent. 154
Perelman explains how "legal reasoning [which] is rhetorical
through and through"' 155 is consistent with the rule of law. Such pragmatic reasoning, however, is too unprincipled for legal theorists who emphasize the integrity of law. Ronald Dworkin, for example, is still
concerned with methods for discovering the right answer to questions of
law. 15 6 But Dworkin himself is a master rhetorician and his ambitions
about law shape his theory; his theory does not determine his ambitions.
Co-editor Steven Mailloux states that our hermeneutics "cannot be a
general account that guarantees correct interpretations."' 1 7 Mailloux
observes that there are not any ahistorical, formal methods for deriving
an "unchanging" textual meaning, because of the shifting context in
which understanding occurs. This is not to say that theories do not have
consequences. But the consequences of theory are not indicative of any
150
151

See Schlesinger, The Opening of the American Mind, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1989, at 1, 27.
Chaim Perelman writes: "Arguments that in substance and form are appropriate to certain

circumstances may appear ridiculous in others. C. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTs-TYTECA, THE NEW
RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 25 (J. Wilkinson & P. Weaver trans. 1969).

152
153

Id. at 511.
Id. at 1.

154 "Authority ends where voluntary assent ends." Winch, "Authority," in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
102 (1966); R.S. Peters writes: "The concept of'authority' is necessary to bring out the ways in
which behavior is regulated without recourse to power-to force, incentives and propaganda." Id. at
93.
155
156
157

READER, supra note 3, at 343.
See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGrrs SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1978).
READER, supra note 3, at 353-54.
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idealistically conceived "absolutely correct" answer to a complex, polyva15 8
lent interpretive problem.
Since the unformalizable historical context is shifting, rhetoric is
viewed as a means to help the law shift gears; that is, rhetoric enables a
constitutional democracy to adapt to changing circumstances. This
thought is nicely developed by James Boyd White. 15 9 White finds Brandeis's approach superior to Chief Justice Taft's in Olmstead v. United
States.1 60 Taft concluded that the government's wiretapping was not a
search or a seizure since the wiretappers did not enter any house, and
16 1
"[t]he evidence was secured by the sense of hearing and that only."'
White claims that Taft "repeatedly characterizes both the facts [in Olinstead] and the [relevant precedent] with a kind of blunt and unquestioning finality, as if everything were obviously and unarguably as he sees
them, and in doing this he prepares us for the conclusory and
unrea1 62
soned characterizations upon which the case ultimately turns.'
Moreover, "for Taft, the Constitution is a document that has no
higher purposes than to tell us what to do; it has no higher purposes, no
discernible values, no aims or context; it is simply an authoritative docu63
ment, the ultimate boss telling us what to do."'
White emphasizes how the Chief Justice tries to convince us that
"the Fourth Amendment is [not] about anything important or valuable; it
is simply a set of words that tells us what to do."' 4 That dictatorial approach, according to White, aims to cut off the kind of participatory dialogue that is necessary in a democracy. White's political rhetoric strikes
the intellect, but why should others, who are less worried about privacy
rights, reject Taft's literal interpretation of the fourth amendment, especially since Taft's interpretation was then in accordance with ordinary
usage? White contends that the dissenting opinion of Brandeis answers
the question.
Brandeis tries to erase Taft's distinctions between wiretapping and
searches by "mov[ing] us in the direction of enlightenment and justice." 6 5 White resorts to some evocative rhetoric 'to convince us that
Brandeis's reading captures the "spirit" of the Constitution, its "general
principles and aims." 16 6 Despite some reservations and qualifications on
White's part, he basically agrees with Brandeis that wiretapping invades
"a right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men."' 167 The rhetorical injection of the "right
158 Mailloux believes that a fully-developed scholarly analysis of interpretation should describe
the "ever-changing background of shared and disputed assumptions, questions, assertions, and so
forth." Id. at 356.
159 Id. at 393-410.
160 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
161 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
162 RFADER, supra note 3, at 398.
163 Id. at 398-99.
164 Id. at 401.
165 Id at 410.
166 Id at 405.
167 Id. at 406.
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to be let alone" dramatically expands the substantive scope of the
Constitution.
Therefore, another question is raised in Olmstead, a perennially arising question only indirectly relevant to the substantive fourth amendment issue resolved; viz., who decides what the best understanding of the
Constitution is? The Constitution, according to White, "is made ... by
those who read the language of the Framers well, who translate-carry over its
terms to the contemporary world."' 1 68 White observes that the judicial
role enables the judges to demand from the text the deeply value laden
standards of excellence that are shared by all of us. 169 But should courts
determine the content of our shared deeply-value-laden contemporary
standards, and then reconstitute the Constitution accordingly? According to White,
The text [of the Fourth Amendment and presumably other provisions
in the Constitution] at once creates and constrains a liberty (or power)
in its reader, and in so doing so defines for the reader a particular kind
of responsibility. It is in that combination-liberty, constraint, and responsibility, for the reader and maker of 17
texts-that the ethical and
intellectual heart of the law can be found. 0
With this last flourish in rhetorical politics, White's essay and the
Reader conclude. The question is whether White's essay "resolves any of
the anxieties" that concern those, like Meese and Schauer, who worry
about excessive judicial activism.' 7 1 White's essay paradoxically confirms
Levinson's skepticism about the absence of demonstrably correct or safe
methods of interpretation. His essay has power to persuade the competent audience to which Perelman refers, but in whose hands does he
leave the ultimate power of interpretation? White's essay encourages appointed judges to have the last words. Not every judge, however, has the
sagacity ofJustice Brandeis, and yet White's thesis depends on the availability of judges who are capable of helping the community attain "intellectual and moral self-improvement."' 1 72 I suspect few judges are equal
to this responsibility.
VI.

A Final Word

The Reader edited by Levinson and Mailloux should be placed on the
recommended reading list for every law student. It should be required
reading for any professor teaching a law and literature course. I know of
no other book that so efficiently teaches lawyers the rudiments of lawrelated hermeneutics. Indeed, judges ought to study the Reader's essays
and thereby become more knowledgeable about the limits of an interpreter's ability to understand a text.
168 Id. at 408-09 (emphasis added).
169 Justice White emphasizes the continuities in Western thought, and he describes how rhetoric
is equivalent to a dialogue or conversation, which makes and remakes the community over time. Id
at 408.
170 Id. at 410.
171 Id.at viii.
172 Id.at 408.
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I answer the questions presented in the Reader's introduction 7 3 in
the following way: We are not saying anything useful to judges merely by
warning them to stay within the constraints provided by the constitutional text. We must, however, admonish judges to stay within the constraints entailed by the role of the judiciary. These constraints are not
adequately listed in Article III of the Constitution. They must be spelled
out by legal educators, the leaders of the organized bar, the general public, and by officials and leaders of public opinion in positions of political
power.
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See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

